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This article discusses the origins and development of the Sanga insurgency of the 1890s with 
a view to demonstrating that, contrary to commonly held stereotypes, pre-colonial warfare was 
neither simple nor unchanging. Its tactics, it is argued here, repay the sort of close analysis 
commonly reserved for other typologies and theatres of war. The Yeke, against whose 
exploitative system of rule the Sanga and their allies rose up in 1891, survived the onslaught 
by entering into a strategic alliance with Lofoi, a newly established station of the Congo Free 
State, and its limited contingent of regular Force Publique troops. An in-depth examination of 
the joint Yeke-Force Publique counterinsurgency campaign leads to the conclusion that the 
novelty of the ‘small wars’ that accompanied the Scramble for Africa should not be overstated. 
In southern Katanga and, by implication, elsewhere, these confrontations were shaped by 
processes of mutual borrowing in which African military practices and even political aims were 









The study of warfare in Africa remains altogether undeveloped. As a result of this dearth of 
scholarship, African military history has yet to be fully decolonized, and the sub-field remains 
‘perhaps the last bastion of the kind of distorted Eurocentric scholarship that characterised 
African studies before the 1960s.’1 Richard Reid’s remarks apply with special force to the pre-
colonial period, whose conflicts have rarely – if ever – been deemed worthy of detailed 
operational analysis, even in such instances where the available evidence would readily lend 
itself to this kind of treatment.2 Drawing on an underutilized body of sources – primarily the 
records of the Plymouth Brethren (PB) missionaries, in Katanga since 1886, and the personal 
correspondence of Clément Brasseur, the Lofoi chef de poste in 1893-18973 – this article 
examines the dynamics of one specific insurgency on the cusp of the colonial occupation of 
Katanga with a view to demonstrating that, contrary to commonly held stereotypes, pre-
colonial warfare was neither simple nor unchanging. Its tactics and strategies, it is argued here, 
repay the sort of close analysis commonly reserved for other typologies and theatres of war.  
Since the Sanga insurgency was eventually suppressed by a newly-minted Euro-African 
coalition, this paper also aims to intervene in debates about the military aspects of the Scramble 
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for Africa. Patterns of African resistance to the colonial conquest, of course, were a key concern 
of the first generation of professional historians of Africa. Their analyses, however, were 
coloured by the politics of the period and, specifically, the attempt to posit a direct connection 
between so-called ‘primary resistances’ and later decolonization movements.4 For their part, 
military historians proper have been slower in taking up the study of late nineteenth-century 
Euro-African confrontations, and their efforts have also been impaired by the tendency to 
examine these conflicts in isolation from their background and African roots.5 Thus, our second 
objective in this paper is to demonstrate the benefits that accrue from placing the ‘small wars’ 
that accompanied the Scramble for Africa in a deeper chronological context than is commonly 
the case.6 Only by so doing – we contend – can the debate about the ultimate nature and 
ostensible modernity of these military operations be placed on firmer foundations.  
A grassroots rebellion against an oppressive foreign elite, Msiri’s Yeke, the Sanga 
insurgency of the 1890s casts important new light on the rise of warlordism in central Africa 
in the era of global commerce and the manner in which the unprecedented levels of exploitation 
it brought in its wake were experienced by its victims. It also illustrates the fragility of these 
new political formations vis-à-vis determined efforts to sever the external links to which they 
largely owed their economic and military strength. The workings of Msiri’s warlord polity, 
Garenganze, form the subject of the first substantive section of the present article. From an 
operational point of view, the Sanga insurgency represents an unusually well-documented 
instance of guerrilla warfare in an environment still unaffected by direct European politico-
military action. Its origins, development and innovative aspects are examined in the second 
part of the article. A key watershed in the history of the rebellion was the arrival of European-
led military forces on the Katangese scene and their alliance with the beleaguered Yeke 
military. The counterinsurgency campaign jointly carried out by the new partners and the 
rebels’ varied reactions to it are discussed in the third section of the article.  
 
The Yeke Warlord State 
 
Between the early 1850s and the late 1860s, Msiri, a caravan leader turned conqueror, 
succeeded in imposing his and his companions’ sway over much of present-day Haut-Katanga, 
a copper-producing district which western Tanzanian traders, including Msiri’s own father, 
Kalasa, had begun occasionally to visit from the 1830s and which had previously formed the 
western periphery of the Lunda kingdom of Kazembe.7 Better equipped than longer-established 
aristocracies to face the forces of the global trade that was then enveloping the Congo basin,8 
Msiri’s followers – the Yeke – conquered the Sanga and other pre-existing inhabitants of the 
region, and spawned an innovative type of polity. Typifying the revolutionary changes in 
governmentality which were then taking place across vast swathes of what would become the 
Congo Free State (CFS), Garenganze was a warlord state in which the exercise of political 
power had less to do with religious sanction and hereditary principles than with its ruler’s 
charisma and the systematic use of commercially-driven violence. Owing their wealth and 
military strength to trade, Yeke state-builders displayed a consistent willingness to resort to 
forms of extreme compulsion to obtain the ivory and slaves that fed the long-distance 
exchanges with both the eastern and, increasingly, the western coasts of the continent.  
Arab-Swahili trade in southern Katanga might have reached its high point in the late 
1860s. Thereafter, its place in the political economy of the new polity was partly taken over by 
Luso-African and Ovimbundu caravans from present-day Angola. A direct trading link 
between Garenganze and the Ovimbundu plateau was inaugurated in about 1870 by a João 
Baptista Ferreira, who responded to some earlier Yeke entreaties and supplied Msiri ‘with 
powder, guns, and cloth in exchange for ivory.’9 Yeke and other sources clarify that, unlike in 
the case of the eastern trade towards the Swahili coast, the Yeke did not merely await the arrival 
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of foreign merchants in their capital, but actively organized independent westbound caravans 
to transport the ivory and slaves accumulated by Msiri.10 Already in 1875, Benguela, the 
terminus of Ovimbundu trade routes on the Angolan coast, was the principal port of entry for 
the Portuguese- and Belgian-made muskets and gunpowder which Angolan caravans brought 
to Msiri capital, Bunkeya, after negotiating Chokwe and Luvale countries and crossing the 






At the apogee of his power in the 1880s, Msiri acted very much like a merchant prince, 
lording it over Bunkeya – a bustling commercial hub located at the crossroad of several regional 
and long-distance exchange networks12 – and exerting tight control over the kingdom’s external 
trade. Central privileges were especially rigidly enforced in the case of the ivory and slave 
trades. Not only were ivory and slaves exhaustible resources, but they also represented the most 
highly sought-after items of trade among Ovimbundu gun-dealers. Thus, by centralizing in his 
hands the commerce in these two commodities, Msiri was also able to impose a practical 
monopoly over the acquisition and distribution of guns. By 1884, the Ovimbundu-run trade in 
guns and gunpowder had resulted in Msiri being equipped with an impressive force of ‘2,000 
or 3,000 flintlock muskets’.13 This arsenal exceeded that of any other regional power, and its 
‘considerable’ size was well-known to neighbouring peoples.14 
To be sure, the creation of dependencies and relations of reciprocity through the 
circulation of foreign goods was part of Msiri’s political repertoire; yet such institutions of rule 
were largely confined to the Yeke and Yekeized elites. Conversely, the bulk of Garenganze’s 
subject peoples constituted a mass of primary producers to be preyed upon. Resource extraction 
in the heartland of the polity and even some of the more distant peripheral regions acquired 
over the course of the 1870s-1880s was ensured by a network of centrally-appointed officials, 
the banangwa (sing. mwanangwa). Frequently chosen from within the ranks of Msiri’s close 
patrilineal relatives, Yeke banangwa served as tribute collectors and also as military and 
caravan leaders.15 Insofar as ivory and slaves were concerned, the Yeke devised a ‘system of 
compulsory production quotas’ destined to increase their ruler’s access to such indispensable 
commodities.16 Msiri’s exactions – what Delcommune, the leader of one of the first Belgian 
expeditions to Katanga, called the ‘insatiable avidity of the king’ in demanding ivory and slaves 
for sale to the Ovimbundu17 – caused real hardship to subject peoples. Chief Mapanda – for 
instance – complained to PB missionary Crawford that Msiri had once given him only ‘a paltry 
four yards of cloth’ and ‘no remuneration whatever to his men’ in return for a massive tribute 
of ‘forty teeth of ivory’.18 In another instance, a seeming shortfall in the expected ivory 
payment late in 1889 led to the execution of an unnamed local leader by the son of Dikuku, 
Msiri’s brother. ‘In a day or two’ – wrote another missionary – ‘the head of this poor 
unfortunate, with those of all his male villagers, will be presented to Msidi with great pomp 
and ceremony. The females and children will become the slaves of the Vayeke.’19  
Besides tribute, raids were the principal means through which captives were obtained 
for both trading and internal purposes. Carried out by comparatively heavily-armed, semi-
professional infantrymen, slave forays punctuated the economic life of Garenganze and 
accounted for the spread of violence and the overall militarization of society in Katanga in the 
latter part of the century. The PB missionary Arnot, the first European to spend a long period 
of time among the Yeke, remarked in August 1886 that Msiri was ‘constantly sending out war 
parties to the countries all round’.20 These war parties – he explained elsewhere – brought back 
‘[l]arge numbers of slaves’ who were ‘sold chiefly to Arab traders from Zanzibar and to 
Ovimbundu traders from Bihé. Strong young men’ – he concluded – ‘have been sold for ten or 
twelve yards of cotton cloth.’21 Women were probably more frequently kept in Bunkeya and 
surrounding areas with a view to exploiting their labour and reproductive potential.22 The 
pervasiveness of slave-raiding activities accounts for the fact that the ‘proportion of women to 
men [was] very unequal’ in Bunkeya and for the capital’s oft-remarked-upon cosmopolitan 
nature.23 For ‘[w]hat means the babel of tongues heard in this country, if not that Msidi’s war 
parties have brought in from nearly every point of the compass gangs of poor down-trodden 
mortals, who were swooped down upon in their little hamlets far away and carried off?’24  
According to Legros’ informants, the average Yeke raiding party was led by one or 
more mutwale (who were also frequently banangwa) designated and appointed by Msiri. Each 
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mutwale commanded a bulungu, the basic Yeke military unit. This consisted of a core of about 
twenty gunmen, whose firearms were personally entrusted to them by Msiri, and a further 
group of more lightly armed fighters, numbering between sixty and one hundred.25 Depending 
on the nature of the particular expedition being prepared, several bulungu could operate 
together. In 1885, for instance, Capello and Ivens encountered a large Yeke war band near 
present-day Lubumbashi. On this occasion, the overall leader of the ‘horde of brigands’, the 
aforementioned Dikuku (‘Licuco’), commanded ‘about 400 men’ equipped with ‘firearms, 




How did Yeke militarism and violent forms of governance impact on the social landscape of 
Katanga? From a purely military point of view, the frequency of Yeke predatory raids and, to 
a lesser extent, full-blown wars of expansion and their reliance on firearms account for the 
spread and increasing use of fortifications in the region. Defences around settlements varied a 
great deal. The most elaborate were probably those surrounding permanent Arab-Swahili bases 
in the interior. For instance, Shimba’s stockaded headquarters on Kilwa Island, Lake Mweru, 
which neither Yeke nor Congo Free State Forces ever managed to storm in the late 1880s and 
early 1890s,27 included ‘two bullet-proof blockhouses; [there was] no ditch but a two- or three-
metre tall wooden rampart that could not be scaled.’28 But basic fortifications consisting of a 
crenelated palisade and encircling ditch were to be found in virtually every Katangese village.29 
These became especially effective when associated with such natural defences as caves and 
crags. Defensive complexes of this kind enabled a number of mountain communities to retain 
a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the Yeke,30 and would prove difficult to overcome even for 
European-led forces. In June 1895, for example, chef de poste Brasseur had ‘one man killed 
and three wounded’ when he rushed the village of Kalera, on the eastern flank of the Mitumba 
Mountains. ‘The natives’, after ‘defend[ing] themselves like devils’, evacuated their village 
and retreated into a natural tunnel which Brasseur dared not enter ‘for I would lose half of my 
soldiers there. […]. There must be three or four exits to these tunnels, but no one besides the 
people of the village knows them.’31 Three years later, Delvaux, one of Brasseur’s successors 
in Katanga, came to identical conclusions when he took on another naturally-fortified 
settlement, Mukana’s. There was – he argued – simply ‘no hope of entering the cave’ in which 
the defenders had sought shelter after pulling out of their village.32 
 Because of the wide distribution of fortifications, most military encounters in late 
nineteenth-century Katanga appear to have involved more or less prolonged sieges (though, at 
least in areas of limited visibility, ambushes must have been common as well). Reflecting the 
prejudices of his time and race – which construed African conflict as either exceptionally 
savage or, conversely, as exceptionally mild and cowardly33 – Brasseur was dismissive of this 
form of warfare and its lethality.  
 
When the natives attack another village, they take position nearby – at a distance of a few hundred metres 
– build a stockade and remain there for months, killing whoever leaves the village and destroying the 
crops. ‘They should make a sortie’, you will say. They are niggers, you see, and then the attacker is 
always supposedly stronger than the defender. In short, if there are two or three fatalities on both sides, 
the affair was a hot one.34 
 
In fact – regardless of whether assaults were truly ‘unknown’ to local Africans, another of 
Brasseur’s questionable generalizations35 – sieges no doubt entailed significant hardship and 
constant vigilance. Coupled with the effects of the adoption of firearms in battle, they are likely 
to have resulted in enhanced military discipline for attackers and defenders alike.36  
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 If these were the most common rules of battle at the height of Yeke power – if, that is, 
late nineteenth-century Katangese warfare was at least partly static – then the Sanga-led 
insurgency of 1891 was a game changer. Coinciding with the adoption of openly aggressive 
tactics by the victims of Yeke predation, it witnessed the emergence of a type of hit-and-run 
warfare which even coeval witnesses saw fit to describe under the rubric of ‘guerrilla’.37 The 
key advantage of guerrilla methods, of course, is that they enable relatively small, but highly 
mobile, group of fighters to avoid set-piece battles while still striking at the heart of what, at 
least initially, constitutes a superior enemy in terms of both manpower and resources. Crucially, 
the Sanga met three essential preconditions for waging a successful insurgency: intimate 
knowledge of local terrain; widespread grassroots support; and a highly motivated leadership.  
 The Sanga were ‘famous’ hunters who had apparently enjoyed a ‘monopoly over 
elephant hunting’ before the inception of Garenganze.38 No doubt, the bushcraft skills 
accumulated during decades of intensive hunting stood them in good stead once they embarked 
on the path of armed resistance.39 Moreover, to the extent that tactics are shaped by terrain, 
guerrilla methods were well-suited to the topography of southern Katanga, a region 
characterised by the presence of such difficult and sparsely populated environments as 
mountain ranges and flatlands subject to seasonal flooding. The leaders of the rebellion were 
Sanga hereditary title-holders, whom the Yeke had subjugated but not replaced. While our 
sources do not permit a full discussion of their individual motivations and commitment to the 
insurgency, some tantalizing insights into the background and disposition of at least one rebel 
leader, Mulowanyama, are provided by Campbell. Mulowanyama – the PB missionary 
reminisced in the early 1920s – was a ‘veritable modern Nimrod’ whose name, in fact, meant 
‘game wizard’. Having had ‘his ears cropped off by order’ of Msiri, his hatred for the latter 
‘and his tribe, the Ba-Yeke’, was ‘implacable’.40 In this, Mulowanyama was far from alone, 
for ‘all the Sanga’ – if we are to believe Delcommune – hated the Yeke ‘looters with a passion’. 
The mere mention of the name ‘Yeke’ – ‘detested throughout Katanga’ – was enough to 
‘inflame their eyes with rage’.41 This reservoir of popular resentment – itself the product of the 
divisiveness and exploitativeness of the late nineteenth-century warlord order – granted the 
insurgents the grassroots backing and protection that every successful guerrilla movement 
requires. And if further proof is needed of the popularity of the rebellion, it is provided by the 
rapidity with which it spread, drawing into its fold not only the bulk of the Sanga, but several 
non-Sanga communities as well.  
The insurgency’s spark, as is confirmed by several coeval sources, was the accidental 
murder of Masengo, a Sanga woman, and the subsequent refusal on Msiri’s part to hand over 
the legal culprit – that is, the Yeke owner of the slave who had fired the accidental gunshot.42 
But the fate of Masengo was a mere ‘casus belli’, behind which, as the eyewitness Crawford 
put it, lay ‘deep, deep-seated grudges of long-standing against Msidi’s tyranny’.43 Building 
perhaps on the socially-sanctioned recourse of slighted parties, who became kapondo 
(assassins) to avenge an individual wrong,44 the Sanga, who had certainly managed to 
accumulate some muskets by the time of the rebellion, began a series of nightly attacks against 
Bunkeya and other centres of Yeke power. The first recorded action of the war took place 
during the night of 20-21 February 1891, when seven huts in Msiri’s own section of Bunkeya, 
Nkulu, ‘were maliciously set on fire and burnt to the ground’ under the cover of darkness. Two 
women and a child were shot in another quarter of the capital, and one more casualty was 
recorded in Kankofu, the neighbouring village of Ntalasha (‘Ndalasia’), Msiri’s classificatory 
brother.45  
The timing of the attack is interesting: January-February is the height of the rainy 
season in Katanga, and floods make movement, in general, and military manoeuvres, in 
particular, extremely problematic for anyone but the swiftest and most experienced of 
assailants.46 Far from slowing down the Sanga, rain conditions might have actually favoured 
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them, for their forays increased in intensity and geographical extent in the aftermath of the first 
raid on Bunkeya. As early as 26 February, ‘two or three houses were burned down [. . .] at 
different villages’, and ‘many of the Vasanda [sic]’ were already said to have joined the 
rebellion.47 Between March and April, the Yeke settlements of both Dikuku (‘Lukuku’) and 
the more distant Mulenga (‘Molenga’) came under attack.48 An entire village belonging to the 
former was burnt down during the night and several people shot, ‘four of whom died 
immediately’.49 By then, Msiri – whom the Sanga insurrection had reportedly left ‘bewildered’ 
and ‘in a strange lethargic condition’50– ‘no longer [slept] unprotected, but ha[d] a large body-
guard sleeping around his house every night’,51 while the inhabitants of Bunkeya’s outlying 
quarters were being forced to seek shelter from ‘the night raids of the Vasanga’ in the central, 
fortified, areas of the capital, where they built a great many temporary accommodations.52  
One of the obvious aims of the guerrillas was to generate panic among the inhabitants 
of Yeke settlements by asserting their ability to strike undetected at even the most closely 
guarded of targets. In this, they were successful, since by May feelings ‘in and around the 
Capital’ were running high, as residents felt unprotected by Msiri and ‘liable to be shot down 
at any time.’53 The contrast could not have been greater with the situation obtaining only a few 
years earlier, when the silence and safety of Bunkeya nights had impressed Arnot, prompting 
him to conclude that ‘life and property […] are safer here than in much-favoured England.’54 
But Sanga attacks were not always random and clearly drew on preliminary intelligence. On 
occasions, they singled out specific members of the Yeke or Yekeized hierarchy, such as 
headman ‘Muluwe’, who had his ‘omande’ shell – a key symbol of Yekehood  – removed from 
his body before being ‘shot through the heart’ in the early hours of 10 May.55 The fact that 
Muluwe’s women and children escaped his burning village and sought refuge at the mission 
suggests that the seizing of prisoners (which in some cases might have amounted to the 
liberation of captives of the Yeke) was probably a frequent by-product of Sanga incursions, 
though the PB missionaries only make explicit mention of it once, in the context of an attack 
on a Yeke colony near chief Katanga in late May or early June.56 In this connection, it is 
probably relevant to note that, in 1895, Mulowanyama was still in the possession of ‘a hundred 
or so women he had abducted from the Yeke’ at an unspecified period in the past.57 
 Not the least innovative aspect of the insurgency was its economic dimension. 
Revealing a good grasp of the political economy of Msiri’s warlord state, the Sanga resolved 
to pair their direct military actions with a policy of strangulation intended to disrupt the lines 
of communication between the heartland of Garenganze and the Ovimbundu plateau, thereby 
preventing Msiri from resupplying his military stock with new muskets and, especially, 
gunpowder, at a time in which his forces were also being tested by the Lunda of Kazembe, on 
the lower Luapula, and by Shimba, on Lake Mweru. By ‘stopping and looting Msiri’s caravans’ 
at, or en route to, the Lualaba ferries,58 the Sanga achieved the twin objective of weakening 
and impoverishing Msiri while funding their own rebellion. This tactic proved highly effective 
in restricting freedom of movement in southern Katanga, as attested in the late spring by CFS 
official Paul Le Marinel, who discovered it was impossible to travel between Bunkeya and the 
headwaters of the Dikulwe, ‘for the Sanga were blocking the routes’.59 Finding himself 
constrained by lack of gunpowder, Msiri could not reply decisively to the outbreak of the 
insurgency and was forced to postpone his counteroffensive for several months.60  
By the end of May, ‘many reports of murders by the Va-sanga’ were reaching the PB 
missionaries, who also learnt that Msiri’s own Sanga drummers had fled Bunkeya ‘and joined 
their countrymen in the rebellion.’61 Over the course of the same month, however, the Yeke 
supply situation registered a temporary improvement, thanks to the powder which Le Marinel 
eventually agreed to give Msiri and to the arrival of a well-stocked Angolan caravan which had 
managed to force the Lualaba blockade.62 Finally ‘in a position to make a big muster of war 
parties’, Msiri dispatched two separate military expeditions in the early summer of 1891. While 
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Dikuku went up the Lufira with a view to protecting the salt pans of Mwashya from attacks by 
the Sanga of Mutwila, another column, led by Msiri’s son, Mukanda Bantu, took a south-
westerly direction and confronted the enemy in the ‘Va-Sanga stronghold’ of Kalunkumia, the 
holder of the Mpande, the ancient paramount chiefly title of the Sanga. After much firing, 
Kalunkumia’s ‘Va-sanga were compelled to evacuate the town and flee south, in the direction 
of Ntenke’s’, who despite being a member of Msiri’s original following and his representative 
among the copper-producing peoples of the upper Lufira River, had by then also joined the 
rebellion.63 ‘No chase seems to have followed, and the war parties returned to the capital 
without striking any decisive blow.’64 
Despite this setback, the Sanga and their growing network of allies held out, while the 
internal situation of the besieged and isolated Garenganze continued to deteriorate. Not only 
had the ‘war […] reduced Msidi’s ivory tribute this year to almost nothing’, but ongoing Sanga 
forays also forced the inhabitants of Bunkeya not to ‘venture out far to the fields they were 
wont to cultivate’ before the start of the insurgency and to limit themselves to ‘tilling the poor 
stony soil’ of the hill around which the Yeke capital had been built.65 This had the effect of 
accelerating the onset of a famine partly brought about by that year ‘exceptionally dry 
condition.’66 Famine and security concerns, in turn, led to population losses. By October-
November, ‘more than half’ of Bunkeya’s population had fled,67 ‘the capital [had] quite a 
deserted look about it’,68 and Msiri was once again short of powder.69 Dikuku, meanwhile, had 
failed to overcome Mutwila,70 while the Lomotwa of the Kundelungu Range, who ‘abhorred’ 
their Yeke mwanangwa, Kifuntwe (‘Kifumtiè’), had thrown their lot in with the rebels.71 
Running out of options, Msiri sought unsuccessfully to induce both Delcommune and the CFS 
officials in Lofoi – the station inaugurated by Le Marinel late in May 1891 – to fight the 
insurgents on his behalf, and might have even contemplated the possibility of shifting the 
location of his capital.72 By mid-December, when William Stairs and his 300 men (200 of 
whom equipped with modern breech-loaders) made their entry into Bunkeya, the famine was 
‘appalling’ and the central symbol of Yeke power a pale shadow of its former self.73 Msiri’s 
father-in-law, the Angolan trader Coïmbra, told Stairs that the ten quarters into which Bunkeya 
had been subdivided a mere three years earlier were now reduced to one and that the hills to 
the south-west of the town, once ‘dotted with flourishing villages’, were now almost entirely 
depopulated.74  
Lack of gunpowder and the Sanga blockade remained Msiri’s most pressing concerns 
to the very end. One last Yeke sortie, against Mulowanyama, took place between November 
and December, in retaliation for an earlier attack on a party of eastbound traders at the Lualaba 
ferry. At the time, the missionary Thompson was being detained by Mulowanyama in the 
village of his Bena Mitumba ally, Mwenda Mukoshi.75  Stating that ‘the Va-Sanga will no 
longer by the slaves of Msidi’, Mulowanyama ‘refused to allow our caravan or any other to 
come to Msidi’s’.76 Eventually, the rebel leader – who appreciated the neutral stance taken by 
the PB and their unwillingness to assist Msiri in communicating with ‘traders to bring powder 
to him’ – was persuaded to give Thompson permission to proceed to Bunkeya, but also insisted 
that the members of his caravan who carried powder stay put until they had exchanged all of it 
locally.77 On 2 December, while negotiations were still ongoing, Thompson witnessed 
Mukanda Bantu’s ambush. ‘I saw men and women returning from the fields in hot haste, and 
making for their villages beside our camp. Immediately I heard the beat of a war drum, and a 
number of shots were discharged in the bush, about 250 yards from our camp. […]. Msidi’s 
party caught about eleven of the Va-sanga in the fields and forthwith decapitated them, as a 
quid pro quo, I suppose, for those killed at the ford by the Va-sanga.’ Thompson’s intervention 
apparently prevented further bloodshed and convinced the Yeke aggressors to decamp without 







Stairs clashed with Msiri over his determination to force the CFS flag on the Yeke warlord and 
refusal to furnish him with the gunpowder he craved.79 Tension escalated between 16 and 20 
December, the day in which Msiri was shot dead by Belgian officer Bodson and his escort.80 
The assassination of Msiri further compounded the plight of the Yeke and their new leader, 
Mukanda Bantu, who were now faced with the very real prospect of complete annihilation. 
Mulowanyama, for one, is said to have appealed to Stairs to ‘exterminate’ all of Msiri’s people 
before his departure.81 In some cases, these aspirations were being into practice. In June 1892, 
for instance, a group of Lomotwa assassinated their former mwanangwa, Kifuntwe 
(‘Cifuntwi’) – an episode which Crawford read as a demonstration of the fact that ‘they who 
once were the oppressors are now in a degree the oppressed.’82 ‘A short time’ afterwards, ten 
followers of Mokembe, Msiri’s brother, were murdered by the ‘Ve na Mitumba’ (Bena 
Mitumba, or Sanga of the Mitumba Mountains) ‘when on a journey of peaceable intent.’83  
The Yeke’s decision to abandon Bunkeya and regroup in and around Lutipisha, to the 
immediate south of the newly-founded CFS post of Lofoi, in late 1892-early 1893 was a clear 
sign of the precariousness of their position.84 In this tense context, Legat, the officer in charge 
of Lofoi in 1891-1893, and his companion Verdick followed a very cautious course of action, 
doing little more than (literally) holding the fort with the thirty-odd regular Force Publique 
soldiers at their disposal. Despite having been enjoined by his superiors to make Lofoi self-
supporting and to gather the greatest possible amount of ivory, the most valuable Katangese 
commodity on the world’s market in the 1890s, Legat – as he would openly admit to his 
successor before leaving the region – never felt strong enough to force the hand of the Sanga 
and other leaders who kept harrying the Yeke, paid no taxes and kept well clear of Lofoi.85 
This wait-and-see policy changed with a vengeance from the autumn of 1893, when Lofoi was 
taken over by a relief column commanded by Lieutenant Clément Brasseur, to whom reference 
has already been made above. 
Determined to maximize the State’s – and therefore his own86 – revenue at all costs, 
Brasseur inaugurated a reign of terror that made a vivid impression on both the PB 
missionaries, who would eventually denounce his doings, and local Africans, by whom he was 
nicknamed Nkulukulu. The Nkulukulu – Judge Jenniges explained a few years after Brasseur’s 
death – was a bird ‘whose inner wings are bloody red. Now, the natives say, Mr. Brasseur was 
only happy when he had blood up to his armpits. Then he looked like the bird in question’.87 
Brasseur’s extractive methods were especially crude. Bespeaking of an earlier warlord order, 
they revolved around the deployment of so-called ‘sentries’ – unsupervised regular soldiers 
stationed in prominent villages and entrusted with the task of collecting ‘“all the ivory in the 
country”’ by hook or crook88 – and the staging of large-scale military expeditions intended 
both to plunder the surroundings of Lofoi and to impress upon local leaders the need to comply 
with instructions relating to taxation in kind and labour.  
For all of his rapaciousness, racism and penchant for violence, Brasseur, left to his own 
devises and those of his few regular soldiers, would never have secured what he termed ‘the 
complete subjugation of the country’.89 Thus, in the furtherance of this objective, he – like 
countless empire-builders before and after him – set out to exploit local conflicts and 
manpower,90 and turned to the beleaguered Yeke. Brasseur himself explained that popular 
‘hatred against the Yeke suit[ed him] perfectly.’91 ‘Having raided, killed and looted overmuch’, 
the ‘remnants’ of the Yeke ‘were now pitted against every other race’. They were as a result 
‘devoted to the whites’.92 But Mukanda Bantu’s surviving followers, of course, had a pressing 
agenda of their own. By reinventing themselves into a rapid deployment, auxiliary force at the 
service of Lofoi, they aspired to rebuild that regional hegemony which the Sanga rebellion and 
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the death of Msiri were threatening fully to eradicate. The alliance with the CFS, in other words, 
offered the Yeke the chance to roll back the years and check the assertiveness of the Sanga and 
other former subjects. In the process, the Yeke military played a critical role in shaping from 
below a violent counterinsurgency campaign which the Europeans coordinated and benefitted 
from, but whose ultimate meanings and direction they did not always control or even fully 
understand. 
Beginning in 1894, Mukanda Bantu and his gunmen participated in all of the major 
expeditions carried out by Brasseur and/or his two deputies. In July of that year, about one-
hundred Yeke joined Brasseur’s foray against Mutwila, guilty of preventing chef Mwashya 
from delivering his quota of salt to Lofoi.93 Mutwila – as we know – had stood up to Dikuku 
in the summer of 1891 and was regarded by the Yeke as a serious menace and one of the main 
causes of ‘the ruin of Msiri’.94 The fortified villages of Mutwila and his brother were stormed 
by the CFS-Yeke force. Numerous children and women were killed during what the missionary 
Campbell called the ‘great slaughter’ that followed the attack.95 Brasseur, his soldiers and 
auxiliaries returned home with, inter alia, sixty female prisoners and fourteen ivory tusks. Even 
though, on this occasion, Brasseur was unimpressed by the performance of his Yeke allies – 
who had apparently behaved cowardly during the assault but as a ‘pack of famished wolves 
scrambling for a corpse’ in its aftermath96 – Mukanda Bantu was naturally delighted at the 
demise of the old opponent, treating Brasseur to a drinking party in Lutipisha and then escorting 
him back to Lofoi with a following of ‘at least 200’ people.97 
But Brasseur’s violence was not always indiscriminate, and his actions suggest that he 
understood that most basic of counterinsurgency tactics: the sowing of divisions among 
opponents by means of both threats and inducements.98 He, in particular, went out of his way 
to prevent his Yeke auxiliaries from attacking Kalunkumia and Mulowanyama’s bases during 
a joint expedition to Sanga and Bena Mitumba territory in the spring of 1895. In the case of the 
former, Brasseur’s conciliatory policy initially worked. Persuaded to return to his capital, 
which he had fled as the military column approached, Kalunkumia accepted to house one of 
Lofoi’s outstations and became a regular ivory contributor until the death of Brasseur.99 
Mulowanyama, on the contrary, sought refuge deep in the Mitumba Mountains, whence – as 
will be seen below – he would spend the last few years of his adventurous life scheming against 
the new dispensation and Yeke-CFS rule.  
Less accommodating or strategically important leaders, on the other hand, could expect 
little mercy. Thus, over the course of the same 1895 tour, Brasseur, his force Publique soldiers 
and Mukanda Bantu’s warriors (probably numbering between 100 and 200) took the side of 
local Yeke grandees against autochthonous claimants in the succession dispute that followed 
the death of one of Msiri’s former subordinates, Kalala Ngombe.100 Both the aforementioned 
attack on Kalera’s and the destruction of Ngonga’s settlement late in May are to be set in this 
context.101 One year later, the bulk of the porters and irregulars who accompanied Brasseur’s 
on his longest tour yet was still made up of Yeke. Targeting another historical enemy of Msiri, 
the Luba-speakers of the Upemba Depression and the Luvua River, this expedition – the most 
murderous of Brasseur’s Katangese journeys – did not witness the direct participation of 
Mukanda Bantu, whose place was taken by mwanangwa Kasadi, attracted to the upper Lualaba 
by the prospect of capturing female slaves galore.102 
Apart from the direct casualties of massacres – along the Lualaba and Luvua rivers 
alone, Brasseur’s mixed forces were responsible for a minimum of 75 deaths between late June 
and early August 1896103 – the human costs of these ‘pacification campaigns’ were probably 
magnified by the processes of adaptation and mutual borrowing which underlay them. 
Mukanda Bantu showed no compunction about imitating Brasseur’s textbook infantry 
tactics.104 But influence did not flow in one direction only, and the pre-colonial military know-
how of Yeke militias could not but have an impact on Brasseur and his Force Publique. Both 
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the practice of living off the land while on campaign and the punitive burning of villages and 
crops (‘a general custom with the Vayeke’, according to the missionary Swan105) enhanced the 
lethality of the Yeke-Force Publique counterinsurgency campaign and the sufferings it inflicted 
on non-combatants. Equally important in psychological terms was the mutilation of the bodies 
of dead enemies, a practice stemming both from Brasseur’s desire to monitor cartridge usage 
and Yeke beliefs in the need to purify the heads of slain enemies.106 The large-scale taking of 
prisoners, meanwhile, served both to increase Lofoi’s servile workforce and to replenish 
Mukanda Bantu and the other Yeke chiefs’ depleted slave stocks. Early in 1892, in the 
immediate aftermath of Msiri’s death, Mukanda Bantu had cut a powerless figure, surrounded 
by a mere ‘handful of people’ and camping among the ruins of Bunkeya, his father’s all but 
deserted former capital.107 By Jan. 1896, however, Lutipisha was being described as a ‘great 
seething town’ harbouring (in Brasseur’s conservative estimate) some 3,000 residents.108 The 
figure of 5,000 was given in June 1897 by Campbell,109 who, however, would later downsize 
his estimate to 3,000. Of these only one fifth were reported to be men,110 a skewed demographic 
composition which suggests that the economic role of female slaves was no less important in 
Lutipisha than it had been in Bunkeya.  
Despite – or perhaps because of – Brasseur and Mukanda Bantu’s efforts, the enemies 
of the Yeke kept up a low-intensity guerrilla war throughout the mid-1890s. Now that the nerve 
centres of the new dispensation – Lofoi and Lutipisha – had been strengthened, the insurgents’ 
forays targeted more remote areas, primarily the Mitumba Mountains, where the inhabitants of 
Yeke settlements were reportedly being fired upon when going into the woods or the fields in 
August 1895.111 It was also in the Mitumbas and, specifically, the Kiamakele network of natural 
tunnels that Mulowanyana sought shelter after he abandoned his less easily defensible village 
in October of the same year.112 Thereafter, Mulowanyama struck an alliance with the then 
Kazembe of the Lualaba, an important title-holder who controlled a ferry across the Lualaba 
and whom Mulowanyama appears to have turned against Lofoi in the early part of 1896.113 
Such worrying developments amongst the Bena Mitumba and along the Lualaba 
prompted Brasseur to send Mukanda Bantu and a 200-man-strong war party drawn from at 
least fifty separate villages on a solo expedition to the areas in question.114 Granted complete 
freedom of action during the journey, Mukanda Bantu was expected to secure the Lualaba 
crossing, attack a number of unyielding Sanga and Bena Mitumba chiefs and bring back as 
much ivory and as many prisoners as possible.115 Mukanda Bantu – who now reportedly 
insisted on being called Nzige (locust), because ‘“I have many people, and when the white man 
sends me somewhere, I raze everything to the ground, like the locusts do”’116 – and his paternal 
uncle Mokembe did not disappoint expectations. Not only did they replace the Kazembe of the 
Lualaba with a man of their choice, kill chief Kasangula and burn down the village and crops 
of Mwenda Mukoshi.117 But by the time they returned to Lofoi in January 1897, they had also 
accumulated ‘twenty-odd women, some boys and 26 tusks’, as well as ‘a great deal of plunder 
from raided villages and the skulls of the people killed during the journey (31) in baskets.’118 
Since such raid was an almost exact replica of one of Msiri’s rafles, it is perhaps not surprising 
that, at least according to Campbell, ‘“one of the male prisoners […] was sacrificed at the grave 
of old Msiri unknown to the State.”’119 
For all its immediate effectiveness, Mukanda Bantu’s counterinsurgency expedition 
created more problems than it solved for Brasseur. By as early as March 1897, the chiefs 
targeted by Mukanda Bantu had regrouped and declared war on the Yeke village of Kalala 
Ngombe.120 At about the same time, a Sanga force of which Mulowanyana might have been 
part seized the village of the Yeke-backed Kazembe of the Lualaba and replaced the latter with 
a competitor.121 By April, ‘exception made for five or six villages, the Bena Mitumba [had] 
risen up almost everywhere’,122 attacking isolated Yeke villages in a repeat of the hit-and-run 
tactics pioneered by their Sanga peers at the beginning of the decade. In the summer, ‘hardly a 
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month’ went by without ‘one chief or another’ complaining to Brasseur that ‘his village ha[d] 
been burned down and his people killed.’123 Eventually, Brasseur came to the conclusion that 
the rebellion that was engulfing the Mitumbas – one in which he suspected the Sanga 
paramount, Kalunkumia, of being implicated124 – necessitated the dispatching of another 
punitive expedition by Mukanda Bantu. This was tentatively scheduled for after his own return 
from the Lualaba, where he travelled in August 1897 to thwart the Sanga-supported Kazembe 
of the Lualaba and officially re-install the Yeke’s candidate.125  
Brasseur’s plans for reducing the ongoing insurgency were brought to an abrupt end by 
his death in November 1897, when he was fatally wounded during the siege of the fortified 
settlement of the coastal trader Kiwala, on the upper Luapula River. Despite missionary 
expectations to the effect that his demise might bring about ‘a more humane state of affairs in 
Katanga’,126 the Yeke-Force Publique counterinsurgency effort proceeded unabated, reaching 
its violent climax in 1899. In 1898 – as Verdick, the new chef de poste, discovered during a 
tour of the south-east – Kalunkumia, ‘disgruntled’ by ‘the protection afforded to the Yeke’ by 
Lofoi,127 threw moderation to the wind: followed by many of his subjects, he abandoned his 
village on the upper Dikulwe and settled in Kiamakele, near Mulowanyama’s.128 During the 
previous two years, Mulowanyama – whose local ‘prestige and influence’ were ‘considerable’ 
– had reportedly ‘harassed’ some of the outposts of Lofoi and committed ‘more than fifty 
murders’.129 He was also rumoured to be planning an attack on the missionary George during 
his upcoming return journey from Angola and to be still bent on controlling the Lualaba ferry 
with a view to monopolizing communications with Ovimbundu slave and gun traders.130  
Early in 1899, following some renewed Sanga and Bena Mitumba threats against the 
Kazembe of the Lualaba and the nearby Yeke village of Nguba, Verdick, accompanied by one 
hundred Force Publique soldiers, ‘about fifty’ of Mukanda Bantu’s irregulars and a 47mm 
Nordenfelt cannon, marched against the rebels’ headquarters.131 Mulowanyama’s village was 
bombarded on 20 March. After a heavy exchange of fire – during which a Belgian sub-
lieutenant, Fromont, as well as three regular soldiers and two Yeke auxiliaries were killed – 
the defenders withdrew into their tunnels, which the attackers did not penetrate but sealed from 
the outside by means of large boulders.132 Despite Verdick’s and, later, Delvaux’s attempts to 
negotiate their surrender – and even though Kalunkumia and several other Sanga and Bena 
Mitumba chiefs tendered their final submission in the weeks that followed the assault133 –  
Mulowanyama and his remaining supporters held out in their redoubt for more than three 
months. Having run out of food supplies, the survivors – a paltry group of two men, five women 
and six children – gave up on 25 June; by that point, most of the defenders, including the 
irrepressible Mulowanyama, had succumbed. Once, after several days’ work, he negotiated a 
way into the main tunnel, part of which had collapsed, the Belgian Delvaux discovered to his 
‘horror’ that it was ‘nothing but an immense graveyard’. He counted 178 asphyxiated and 
decomposing corpses and 142 guns.134 Before leaving Kiamakele, Delvaux set fire to the place. 
‘The tunnels caved in one by one, and Mulowanyama’s grave was shut away for ever.’135 The 




During the violent 1890s, Yeke policies were dominated by the imperatives of surviving the 
consequences of the Sanga rebellion and of reconstituting their hegemony in tandem with the 
newly arrived forces of the Congo Free State. Intersecting with European motives, Mukanda 
Bantu’s strategy proved wonderfully effective: not only did the Yeke survive as a corporate 
group against considerable odds, but they did so as the dominant African ethnicity in colonial 
southern Katanga. The real victims were those communities who had rebelled against Yeke 
predation, had briefly regarded the incoming whites as possible saviours,136 and then found 
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themselves at the receiving end of a nasty counterinsurgency campaign jointly carried out by 
the same European-led forces and their former Yeke exploiters.  
The Sanga rebellion was defeated – and several decades of colonial social engineering 
and politico-economic change would prove necessary to heal old wounds. Eventually, as Yeke, 
Sanga and other local ethnicities found a new unity under the banner of an invented Katangese 
‘autochthony’,137 memory of the Sanga insurgency faded into the background (a process to 
which the very gruesomeness of the rebellion’s ending might have contributed). But though 
unsuccessful and now largely forgotten,138 the Sanga rebellion still has some important lessons 
to teach us. First, the central role played by Yeke forces in the ‘pacification’ of Katanga implies 
that historians who stress the innovative character of the ‘small wars’ of nineteenth-century 
imperialism – be it on account of the new technologies they utilized or the unprecedented 
strategic objectives which underpinned them – have invariably tended to overplay their hand.139 
This is not only because – as Walter has recently argued – the imperial wars of the late 
nineteenth century display a ‘striking family resemblance’ with all the violent conflicts that 
have accompanied the territorial expansion of Europe from the sixteenth century.140 More 
important is the fact that what southern Katanga (and much of the rest of central Africa as well) 
witnessed in the 1890s was a process of mutual borrowing and hybridization in which African 
military practices and even political aims were far from being ancillary to European ones. In 
fact – as Macola has argued more at length elsewhere141 – ‘creolization’ processes went beyond 
the military sphere and invested the totality of the early colonial dispensation in the Congo 
basin, which was Africanized, not only through the armed personnel on which it drew, but also 
in the institutions and practices of rule it adopted and in the symbolism of power it was charged 
with. In sum, when it is examined from the ground up and from the perspective of the defeated, 
the conquest of Katanga looks much more like the continuation of an earlier warlord order in 
disguise than like the external imposition of ‘modern’ military and political models. 
More generally, this well-documented instance of rebellion and counterinsurgency 
before and during the colonial occupation of Katanga forcefully reminds us that African 
military history does not begin with the arrival of European forces. Military dynamics were no 
less vibrant and subject to change in the pre-colonial era than in later periods. And a full grasp 
of even the most modern of central African conflicts is destined to remain elusive unless these 
same conflicts are placed in a longue-durée perspective – one that must at least make room for 
the revolutionary transformations experienced by the sub-continent in the nineteenth century 
and the enhanced militarism and predatory style of politics that they brought into being.  
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